Updated February 2024


Associate Professor, University of Tennessee, Fall 2022 — present

Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University, Fall 2018 — Fall 2022

Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University, Fall 2012 — Fall 2018


Monash University, January-July 2022

Monash University, July 2021

CESifo, May 2018

George Washington University, Fall 2015


Associate Editor, Canadian Journal of Economics, 2022 -- present

CESifo Research Network Affiliate, 2018 -- present

Board of Directors, Midwest International Economics Group, 2015 -- present


    Ph.D. in Economics, Johns Hopkins University, July 2012

    M.A. in Economics, Johns Hopkins University, October 2007

    M.Phil. in Economics, first class honors, Monash University, Australia, May 2006

    B.Econ, first class honors, Monash University, Australia, November 2003

    B.Acc, Monash University, Australia, November 2002


    International Trade, Applied Econometrics, Game Theory


    The 2020 US Presidential election and Trump's wars on trade and health insurance, with Jun Nie (Southern Methodist University). European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, June, 102338. Abstract

    The trade war initiated by the Trump administration is the largest since the US imposed the Smoot-Hawley tariffs in the 1930s and was still raging when he left office. We analyze how the trade war impacted the 2020 US Presidential election. Our results highlight the political salience of the trade war: US trade war tariffs boosted Trump's support but foreign retaliation hurt Trump. In particular, the pro-Trump effects of US trade war tariffs were crucial for Trump crossing the recount thresholds in Georgia and Wisconsin. Even more important politically, voters abandoned Trump in counties with large expansions of health insurance coverage since the Affordable Care Act, presumably fearing the roll-back of such expansion. Absent this anti-Trump effect, Trump would have been on the precipice of re-election by winning Georgia, Arizona, Nevada, and only losing Wisconsin by a few thousand votes. These effects of the trade war and health insurance coverage expansion cross political and racial lines, suggesting the mechanism operates through the impact on local economies rather than political polarization. Read more »

    Contesting an International Trade Agreement, with Matt Cole (Cal Poly) and Ben Zissimos (U of Exeter). Journal of International Economics, 2021, January, 103410. Abstract

    We develop a new theoretical political economy framework called a "parallel contest" that emphasizes the political fight over trade agreement (TA) ratification within countries. TA ratification is inherently uncertain in each country because anti- and pro-trade interests contest each other to influence their own government's ratification decision. As in the terms-of-trade theory of TAs, the TA removes terms-of-trade externalities created by unilateral tariffs. But, a TA also creates new terms-of-trade and local-price externalities in our framework due to endogenous ratification uncertainty combined with the requirement that each country ratifies the TA for it to go ahead. Thus, reciprocal TA liberalization fails to eliminate all terms-of-trade externalities. Read more »

    Phase out tariffs, phase in trade?, with Tibor Besedes (Georgia Tech) and Tristan Kohl (U of Groningen). Journal of International Economics, 2020, November, 103385. Abstract

    An important stylized fact in the empirical Free Trade Agreement (FTA) literature is that member trade flows gradually increase over time following an FTA. Baier & Bergstrand (2007) suggest two explanations: tariff phase-out and delayed pass-through of tariffs into import prices. We examine these hypotheses using 1989--2016 U.S. import growth and product-level data on the tariff phase-out negotiated under NAFTA and the earlier Canada-U.S. FTA. We do not find evidence supporting either hypothesis. While products receiving tariff cuts do show delayed import growth relative to products with unchanged tariffs, the delay in import growth does not correspond to delays in the timing of tariff cuts. We also show that tariff cuts are fully and immediately passed through to U.S. importers as there are virtually no changes in the prices received by exporters either in the short run or the long run. Rather, we find evidence for an important role played by NAFTA tariff cuts reducing the impact of frictions that, in turn, allow for a spatial expansion of imports across the U.S. Read more »

    Tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements, with Moise Nken (Ryerson) and Halis M. Yildiz (Ryerson). Journal of International Economics, 2020, January, 103279. Abstract

    We show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation. First, it shapes the nature of forces constraining expansion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The constraining force is a free riding incentive of FTA non-members under relatively high bindings but an exclusion incentive of FTA members under relatively low bindings. Second, multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role played by PTAs in the attainment of global free trade. Initially, tariff binding liberalization leads to Custom Union (CU) formation in equilibrium but in a way that undermines the pursuit of global free trade. However, further tariff binding liberalization leads to FTA formation in equilibrium and in a way that facilitates the attainment of global free trade. Our theoretical analysis also has implications regarding recent empirical discussions over the relative merits of FTAs versus CUs. Read more »

    Preferential Trade Agreements: Recent theoretical and empirical developments, with Pravin Krishna (Johns Hopkins). Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance, 2019. Abstract

    In recent decades, there has been a dramatic proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between countries that, while legal, contradict the non-discrimination principle of the world trade system. This raises various issues, both theoretical and empirical, regarding the evolution of trade policy within the world trade system and the welfare implications for PTA members and non-members. The survey starts with the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama and Panagariya-Krishna analyses in the literature that theoretically show PTAs can always be constructed so that they (weakly) increase the welfare of members and non-members. Considerable attention is then devoted to recent developments on the interaction between PTAs and multilateral trade liberalization, focusing on two key incentives: an “exclusion incentive” of PTA members and a “free riding incentive” of PTA non-members. While the baseline presumption one should have in mind is that these incentives lead PTAs to inhibit the ultimate degree of global trade liberalization, this presumption can be overturned when dynamic considerations are taken into account or when countries can negotiate the degree of multilateral liberalization rather than facing a binary choice over global free trade. Promising areas for pushing this theoretical literature forward include the growing use of quantitative trade models, incorporating rules of origin and global value chains, modeling the issues surrounding “mega-regional” agreements, and modelling the possibility of exit from PTAs. Empirical evidence in the literature is mixed regarding whether PTAs lead to trade diversion or trade creation, whether PTAs have significant adverse effects on non-member terms-of-trade, whether PTAs lead members to lower external tariffs on non-members, and the role of PTAs in facilitating deep integration among members. Read more »

    Dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements: The role of flexibility. Canadian Journal of Economics, 2019, 52(1), 132-177. Abstract

    In practice, free trade agreements (FTAs) vastly outnumber customs unions (CUs). Nevertheless, the literature traditionally views CUs as optimal for members because CU members coordinate external tariffs. I show that a dynamic FTA flexibility benefit can help explain the prevalence of FTAs: individual FTA members have the flexibility to form their own future FTAs whereas CU members must jointly engage in future CU formation. I show how the relative prevalence of FTAs versus CUs depends on the structure of market size asymmetry across countries and use these predictions to shed some light on FTA versus CU formation in Europe and South America. Read more »

    Are global trade negotiations behind a fragmented world of "gated globalization"?, with Santanu Roy (Southern Methodist University). Journal of International Economics, 2017, 108, 117-136. Abstract

    We show that global trade negotiations can prevent global free trade. In a simple model where global tariff negotiations precede sequential Free Trade Agreement (FTA), we show FTA formation can expand all the way to global free trade in the absence of global tariff negotiations but global free trade never emerges when global tariff negotiations precede FTA formation. This result arises precisely because global tariff negotiations successfully elicit concessions from negotiating countries. Moreover, global tariff negotiations can produce a fragmented world of "gated globalization" where some countries form FTAs eliminating tariff barriers among themselves while outsiders continue facing higher tariffs. Read more »

    Free Trade Agreements as dynamic farsighted networks. Economic Inquiry, 2017, 55(1), 31-50. Abstract

    In the presence of multilateral negotiations, are Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) necessary for, or will they prevent, global free trade? I answer this question using a dynamic farsighted model of network formation among asymmetric countries. Ultimately, FTAs prevent global free trade when there are two larger countries and one smaller country but FTAs can be necessary for global free trade when there are two smaller countries and one larger country. The model provides insights into the dynamics of recent real world trade negotiations and recent results in the literature on the empirical determinants of trade agreements. Read more »

    On the different geographic characteristics of Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions, with Halis M. Yildiz (Ryerson). Journal of International Economics, 2016, 103, 213-233. Abstract

    Casual observation reveals a striking phenomenon of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): while Customs Unions (CUs) are only intra-regional, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are inter and intra-regional. Using a farsighted dynamic model, we endogenize the equilibrium path of PTAs among two close countries and one far country. Rising transport costs mitigate the cost of discrimination faced by the far country as a CU non-member and diminish the value of preferential access as a CU member. Thus, sufficiently large transport costs imply an FTA is the only type of PTA that can induce the far country's participation in PTA formation. Unlike CU formation, FTA formation can induce participation because FTAs provide a flexibility benefit: an FTA member can form further PTAs with non-members but a CU member must do so jointly with all existing members. Hence, in equilibrium, CUs are intra-regional while FTAs are intra- and inter-regional. Read more »

    Could tariffs be pro-cyclical?, with Maia Linask (U of Richmond). Journal of International Economics, 2016, 103, 124-146. Abstract

    Conventional wisdom says tariffs are counter-cyclical. We analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied tariffs using a disaggregated product-level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011. Strikingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, we find that tariffs are pro-cyclical. Further investigation reveals this pro-cylicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries; tariffs are acyclical in developed countries. We present evidence that pro-cyclical market power drives the pro-cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries, providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy. Read more »

    Domestic political competition and pro-cyclical import protection, with Maia Linask (U of Richmond), Review of International Economics, 2016, 24(3) 564-591. Abstract

    Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding over- hang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro-cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro-cyclical when high-tariff interests (e.g. import-competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low-tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate stronger lobbying threats. Read more »

    An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade, with Dann Millimet (Southern Methodist University), Journal of International Economics, 2016, 99, 156-178. Abstract

    Even if free trade creates net welfare gains for a country as a whole, the associated distributional implications can undermine the political viability of free trade. We show that trade-related redistribution -- as presently constituted -- modestly increases the political viability of free trade in the US. We do so by assessing the causal effect of expected redistribution associated with the US Trade Adjustment Assistance program on US Congressional voting behavior on eleven Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between 2003 and 2011. We find that a one standard deviation increase in expected redistribution leads to an average increase in the probability of voting in favor of an FTA of 1.8 percentage points. Although this is a modest impact on average, we find significant heterogeneities; in particular, the effect is larger when a representative's constituents are more at risk or the representative faces greater re-election risk. Read more »

    Costly distribution and the non–equivalence of tariffs and quotas, with Maia Linask (U of Richmond), Public Choice, 2015, 165(3), 211-238. Abstract

    When governments impose a quota or tariff on imports, it is well known that the resulting rents and revenues trigger costly rent-seeking and revenue-seeking activities, which are welfare- reducing and may be economically more significant than the efficiency losses resulting from the quota/tariff-induced resource reallocation. Repeated interaction among firms can eliminate wasteful rent- and revenue-seeking expenditures through cooperation. We show that while aggregate outcomes are equivalent under tariffs and quotas if cooperation arises, the conditions under which cooperation arises differ by policy. This difference arises because a firm must incur additional cost to physically import and distribute the goods associated with additional quota licenses, whereas there is no such cost when it comes to consuming additional tariff revenue. Thus, quotas and tariffs are non-equivalent. We provide a simple sufficient condition under which cooperative elimination of rent-seeking under quotas is easier than cooperative elimination of revenue-seeking under tariffs and therefore a quota is the optimal policy whenever the optimal policy admits cooperation. Read more »

    Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures, European Journal of Political Economy, 2015, 37, 86–101. Abstract

    Unfortunately, data on campaign contributions of PACs (political action committees) in the US does not contain the PACs issues of concern. Additionally, while recent US lobbying data details the issues of concern for an interest group, it does not detail the Congressional representatives lobbied by the interest group. Using the 1997–98 Congressional cycle, earlier work showed PACs engaging in lobbying and campaign contributions account for the vast majority of such political money even though they represent a small minority of all PACs. Using an expanded time period, I show this is a systematic feature of the US political system and how it allows construction of a novel dataset that decomposes representative-specific contributions across issues as well as issue-specific lobbying expenditures across representatives. Further, I show this decomposition can qualitatively affect results regarding the relationship between political money and Congressional voting behavior on trade policy. Read more »


    Local labor market effects of the 2002 Bush steel tariffs, with Ding Liu (Southern Methodist University). R&R at AEJ: Policy. Abstract

    President Bush imposed safeguard tariffs on steel in early 2002. Using US input-output tables and a generalized difference-in-difference methodology, we analyze the local labor market employment effects of these tariffs depending on the local labor market's reliance on steel as an input and as part of local production. We find the tariffs did not boost local steel employment but substantially depressed local employment in steel-consuming industries for many years after Bush removed the tariffs. These large and persistent negative effects were concentrated in local labor markets that had low human capital or were strongly specialized in steel-consuming industries. Read more »

    US Inequality in the 1980s: The Tokyo Round Trade Liberalization and the Swiss Formula, with Andrew Greenland (North Carolina State) and John Lopresti (William & Mary). Under review. Abstract

    Against a backdrop of sharply rising inequality, the Tokyo Round of the GATT resulted in a 1.6 percentage point reduction in average US tariffs -- larger than CUSFTA, NAFTA, and the liberalization accompanying the granting of PNTR to China. We construct a novel IV based on the so-called ``Swiss formula'' that governed Tokyo Round tariff liberalization to provide the first evidence of its effects on imports and inequality. Instrumented tariff reductions explain 17\% of the within-industry rise in income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers between 1979 and 1988. This effect is largest in more technology-intensive industries, suggesting a complementarity between trade liberalization and skill-biased technological change. We also show that tariff liberalization in upstream industries produced a shift away from labor more broadly and towards intermediate inputs. Finally, we show that policymakers dampened the observed impact of tariffs on inequality by assigning smaller tariff reductions to industries more reliant on low-skilled labor. Read more »

    The GATT vs inflation: Tokyo drift, with Andrew Greenland (North Carolina State) and John Lopresti (William & Mary). Abstract

    Despite the negotiated tariff liberalization in the 1979 Tokyo GATT Round, the US aggregate tariff rate drifted upwards over the following decade. In stark contrast, the aggregate tariff rate fell sharply in the years prior to the Tokyo Round despite no legislated changes in US tariff policy. We shed light on these puzzling dynamics by reconstructing the US tariff code annually between 1972 and 1988 and document a two-phase liberalization. From 1972 to 1979, inflation eroded the ad valorem equivalent rate of specific tariffs -- which account for up to 35\% of tariff protection in our sample -- resulting in an ``accidental'' liberalization. Between 1980 and 1988, a change in the composition of US imports masked a four percentage point reduction in legislated tariffs resulting from Tokyo Round GATT negotiations. To emphasize the aggregate importance of specific tariffs in this era, we embed them in a simple CES framework and extend existing hat algebra techniques to incorporate specific tariffs. Our counterfactual analysis shows the inflationary erosion of specific tariffs yielded greater welfare gains than the GATT-mandated phaseout of legislated tariffs. Read more »

    Good jobs, bad jobs: what's trade got to do with it?, with Dann Millimet (Southern Methodist University). Abstract

    Using US local labor markets between 1990 and 2010, we analyze the heterogeneous impact of rising trade exposure on employment growth of "good" and "bad" jobs. Three salient findings emerge. First, rising local exposure to import competition, via falling US tariffs or rising Chinese import penetration, reduces (increases) employment growth of bad (good) jobs. Conversely, improved local access to export markets, via falling foreign tariffs, increases (reduces) employment growth of bad (good) jobs. Second, falling US tariff protection is substantially more important, economically and statistically, than rising Chinese import penetration. Third, globalization generates occupational polarization but not job polarization. Read more »

    Heterogeneous job polarization in the US, with Dann Millimet (Southern Methodist University). Abstract

    We investigate job polarization in the US. Significant heterogeneity is found across sectors, with the tradable goods sector exhibiting anti-polarization. This is consistent with the theoretical trade model of Grossman and Maggi (2000). Read more »

    Dynamic farsighted networks with endogenous opportunities of link formation. Abstract

    I present a three player dynamic network theoretic model where players are farsighted and asymmetric. Unlike the previous literature that imposes an exogenous protocol governing the order of negotiations, I allow the identity of the players who form a link in a given period to depend endogenously on player characteristics. Importantly, I show how this can give different predictions regarding attainment of the complete network relative to models with an exogenous protocol. Regardless of whether the complete network is efficient, a key dynamic trade off drives whether the complete network is attained in my model. A pair of players (insiders) may form a link with each other but, even though link formation is always myopically bene.cial, each insider then refuses subsequent link formation with the third player (outsider) because the eventual attainment of the complete network makes each insider worse off relative to the insider–outsider network. Read more »


    Trade and inequality: Revisiting the 1980s with a new approach and new data, with Andrew Greenland (North Carolina State) and John Lopresti (William & Mary).

    Trade Restrictiveness Indices 2.0, with Massimilano Cali (World Bank), Aufa Doraset (World Bank) and Laura Puzzello (Monash University)

    Plurilaterals and the pursuit of global free trade, with Lasha Chochua (Bielefeld University) and Gerald Willman (Bielefeld University).

    Contesting the environment, with Matt Cole (Cal Poly) and Ben Zissimos (U of Exeter)

    Structural transformation and labor mobility over the life cycle, with Masha Brussevich (IMF) and Mike Sposi (Dallas Fed)

    The changing nature of protection and its consequences for welfare: Evidence from Indonesia, with Massimilano Cali (World Bank), Aufa Doraset (World Bank) and Laura Puzzello (Monash University)

    Lobbying for tariff phaseouts in US bilateral Free Trade Agreements, with Shushanik Hakobyan (IMF) and Tristan Kohl (U of Groningen)


    Local labor market effects of the 2002 Bush steel tariffs, Research Briefs in Economic Policy, May 17 2023, No. 332, Cato Institute.

    The Importance (or not) of Bilateral Trade Deficits, National Economic Education Delegation (NEED), March 24, 2020.

    Market Scale podcast: U.S. and China Trade War, and Why Experts Disagree on its Impact, July 31, 2019.

    NBC5 interview: Economic impact of possible border shutdown, April 2, 2019.

    What 4 economists say about the state of the union, The Conversation, January 30, 2019.

    Trump was dealt a winning hand on trade – his hardball negotiating tactics are squandering it, The Conversation, November 29, 2018.

    Don't Blame Trade for Killing the Middle-Tier Jobs We Need, The Catalyst, Fall 2018, Issue 12, George W. Bush Institute.

    Executive Trade Policy Authority: A Threat to America’s Global Leadership on Trade, George W. Bush Institute, July 31, 2018.

    Withdrawal from the World Trade Organization Would Be a Mistake, George W. Bush Institute, July 10, 2018.


    * Indicates keynote lecture

    2024: University of Melbourne (scheduled), Toronto Metropolitan University (scheduled), Australasian Trade Workshop (scheduled)

    2023: Vanderbilt, Purdue, San Diego State, Western Economic Association International Meetings (Melbourne), CESifo Global Economy Conference

    2022: *Global Value Chain Research & Training Workshop, Kansas State University, U of Tennessee, USITC, Online Australasian International Trade Seminar (OASIS), Queensland University of Technology, WTO Workshop at Bielefeld University, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings

    2021: Southern Economic Association, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings, University of Texas San Antonio, Empirical Trade Online Seminar, Monash University, Asia Pacific Trade Seminars, Deakin University

    2020: WTO Workshop at Bielefeld University (COVID cancelled), Australasian Trade Workshop (COVID cancelled)

    2019: Texas A&M (Corpus Christi), Stanford

    2018: ASSA Meetings, Taxes A&M (Ag Econ), LMU Munich, Syracuse, Spring Midwest Trade Meetings, Cal Poly Trade Workshop, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings, Texas Theory Camp, EIIT (discussant)

    2017: U of Indiana

    2016: FGV-EESP (Sao Paulo School of Economics), Pontifica Universidad Javeriana, U of Oklahoma, Southern Economic Association, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings

    2015: Georgia Tech, Ryerson University, Washington & Lee University, University of Richmond, George Washington University, USITC, Spring Midwest Trade Meetings, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings, Asia Pacific Trade Seminars, SAET conference, UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, Washington DC Junior Trade Study Group

    2014: KU Leuven Workshop on Trade Agreements, Spring Midwest Trade Meetings, Silvaplana Workshop in Political Economy, Kansas State University, Texas Theory Camp

    2013: LSU Conference on Networks, Australasian Trade Conference, Monash University, University of New South Wales, Ryerson, Spring Midwest Trade Meetings, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings

    2012: CIRANO Workshop on Networks in Trade and Finance, Fall Midwest Trade Meetings, Texas Theory Camp, University of Tennessee, College of William and Mary, U of Memphis, SAIS Bologna

    2011: European Economic Association Meetings, Stony Brook Game Theory Festival Workshop on Game Theory in Trade and Development, Asia Pacific Trade Seminars, Western Economic Association, Public Economic Theory Conference, Spring Midwest Trade Meetings

    2010: Eastern Economic Association


    2019: Texas A&M (Corpus Christi), 2019 Commerce Street Annual Investment Conference, Dallas Association for Business Economics (Fall Meeting), Adam Smith Society debate on Trade Policy & Tariffs

    2018: Federal Reserve Bank of Houston (International Marketplace), SeatonHill, SMU Cox Business School (SBI Program), SMU Alexander Hamilton Society, Owens Conference (SMU Tower Center & Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas)

    2017: SMU Cox Business School (ProMexico Board Program)

    2016: Pontifica Universidad Javeriana


    Lobbying for tariff phaseouts in US bilateral Free Trade Agreements, George W. Bush Institute - SMU Economic Growth Initiative Research Grant, $3000, 2019-2021


    AEJ: Micro, AEJ: Policy, American Law and Economics Review, American Political Science Review, Applied Economics Letters, B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Canadian Journal of Economics, Contemporary Economic Policy, Ecological Economics, Econometrica, Economic Inquiry, Economic Modelling, Economic Record, Economic Systems, Economics & Politics, Economics Letters, Empirical Economics, European Economic Review, European Journal of Political Economy, International Economic Review, International Review of Economics & Finance, International Tax & Public Finance, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of International Economics, Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics, Journal of Regional Science, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance, Pacific Economic Review, Public Choice, Review of International Economics, Review of International Organizations, Review of World Economics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Southern Economic Journal, World Economy, World Trade Review



    PhD: Microeconomic Theory

    Undergraduate: International Economics for Business


    Undergraduate: International Trade

    Masters: International Trade

    PhD: International Trade

    Johns Hopkins University

    Undergraduate: Econometrics, Elements of Macroeconomics

    Masters: Econometrics (online)



    Current: Jun Nie

    Ding Liu (co-chair, 2022, Analysis Group)

    Aastha Gupta (2022, Western Illinois University)

    Ben Stutts (chair, 2021, ICF)

    Soeun Park (2020, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs)

    Sanchari Choudhury (2018, Saint Xavier's University)

    Mu Liu (2017, Sabre)

    Sunghoon Chung (2013, Korea Development Institute)


    Visakh Madathil (2022)

    Jesse LaBalle (2020, St. Louis Fed RA program, U of Michigan economics PhD program)

    Kelsey Shipman (2020, Fed Board of Governors RA program, Harvard Business School Pre-Doc program)

    Andrew Sneed (2020, Scalar Gauge Fund)


    Provost's Emerging Leaders Program (2020)

    Barbara and James Mangum Teaching Award (2017)



    Clicker advisory committee, Fall 2022 - Fall 2023

    Department of Economics

    Greer seminar series co-ordinator, Fall 2023 - present

    Graduate committee, Fall 2022 - present



    Search committee for the Dean of Moody Graduate School, 2021

    University Research Council Travel & Research Grant Committee, Fall 2020 - Spring 2022

    Faculty Senate Graduate Research & Education Committee, Fall 2020 - Spring 2022

    Academic Technology Council, Summer 2018 - Summer 2021

    Platform Marshall at University Commencement December 2019

    Marshall at University Commencement, May 2015

    Dedman College

    Faculty Council, Fall 2020 - Fall 2022

    Department of Economics

    Director of Doctoral Studies, Fall 2020 - Spring 2022

    Microeconomics PhD student workshop organizer, Fall 2020 - Spring 2022

    Department website coordinator, Fall 2018 - Spring 2022

    Graduate Committee, 2018/19, 2019/20

    Junior recruiting committee, 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/17, 2017/18, 2019/20

    Midwest Economic Theory & International Trade Conference organizer at SMU, Fall 2017

    Brown bag coordinator, 2016/17

    Seminar series coordinator, 2014/15